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JUDGMENTAL NEUTRALITY:
WHEN THE SUPREME COURT INEVITABLY IMPLIES THAT
YOUR RELIGION IS JUST PLAIN WRONG
Lincoln Davis Wilson ∗
[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs
should have been submitted to the jury. . . . [T]he First Amendment precludes such a
course. . . . “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect.” 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

We consider it one of the great features of American democracy
that our government may not make official pronouncements about
particular religions. Because the Supreme Court of the United States
takes seriously the First Amendment’s prohibition of laws “respecting
the Establishment of Religion, or prohibiting the Free Exercise
2
thereof,” church and state are kept separate enough that Congress
may not enact a law, for instance, officially condemning the practice
of Islam or endorsing the practice of Buddhism. Moreover, we are
glad that our courts do not put individual faiths on trial—for example, if Catholic beliefs were at issue in a case, the government would
not permit a priest to be put on the stand to defend before a secular
3
judge the historical and rational merits of Catholicism. A litigant
may have to defend the substance of his legal theory before the court,
but never the substance of his religious faith.

∗
J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.M. Music Composition, 2004, University of Idaho. I am deeply indebted to Angela Carmella, Anthony
Rapa, Evan Wilson, and Edward Hartnett for their valuable help in researching,
drafting, editing, and revising this Comment.
1
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872)).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3
See, e.g., Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (holding that the courts may not adjudicate the
validity of decisions made by religious tribunals).
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For this reason the above quote from United States v. Ballard
rings true. There, the Court held that religious adherents accused of
mail fraud could not be prosecuted on the basis of the verity of their
religious claims, but only on the basis of whether those views were
5
sincerely held. Intuitively, this seems like a principle rightly inherent in the Religion Clauses. Consistent with the principle of Supreme
Court jurisprudence that government ought to be neutral toward religion, government ought not state that a particular religious belief is
true or false. The Court has kept the promise it made in Ballard; an
examination of case law will not disclose a single circumstance in
6
which the Court has explicitly declared a religious belief to be false.
However, each of us communicates much more than what we
state explicitly. Implicit communication can be logically derived
from explicit statements. For instance, if a man says all squirrels are
rodents and that all rodents are animals, we may infer that he would
also say that all squirrels are animals. That he never considers this
implication, that he says he does not care, even that he expressly denies it (“But I’m not saying all squirrels are animals . . . ”), is no matter. If he has asserted the premises are true, he must affirm that the
conclusion is true. In some circumstances, our Supreme Court is like
this squirrel/animal-denier; it expressly declares that it passes no
judgment on the truth of religious claims, but its premises, and more
importantly, the decree of judgment it enters, compel the opposite
conclusion, merely through the dry force of logic.
Suppose that an individual claimant seeks an exemption from a
law of general applicability on the grounds of the Free Exercise
Clause because the law inhibits the practice of his religion. Assume
that the inhibited practice is premised on the individual’s belief in a
universal, objective religious truth. Suppose then that the Supreme
7
Court (or any court for that matter) denies this individual’s Free Exercise claim. When this occurs, the Court has implicitly asserted that
8
this individual’s belief is not true. This assertion is fundamentally at
4

322 U.S. 78 (1944).
Id. at 83–88.
6
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Establishment Clause
case declaring that a permissive separate school district for Hasidic Jews was improper); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise case holding that
the Amish are not exempt from Social Security); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (Free Exercise case granting exception from unemployment compensation
laws to Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on Saturday).
7
The scope of this Comment is limited to the Free Exercise cases adjudicated by
the Supreme Court of the United States, though the principles of the argument
would apply equally to all subordinate courts that decide such issues.
8
That the Court makes this implicit assertion is not important if considered a
5
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odds with the principle of governmental neutrality toward religion
that has been enunciated by the Court, thus resulting in an ironic instance of what this Comment terms “judgmental neutrality.” The
analysis that here follows suggests that the neutrality principle should
therefore be clarified, modified, or abandoned.
A few qualifications are in order. First, this is a descriptive analysis, not a normative analysis. This Comment will not address whether
the tests the Court uses in Free Exercise cases comport with the
United States Constitution, nor will it discuss whether any given case
was decided correctly under the applicable tests, nor will it weigh in
on what the result should have been according to sound social policy.
In addressing individual cases, for instance, this Comment will not
argue that the religious exemption from compulsory education
9
should have been denied in Wisconsin v. Yoder, or that the laws-of10
general-applicability principle from Employment Division v. Smith violates the First Amendment.
Similarly, this is not the work of a zealot (of either the secular or
religious variety) arguing for a principle of greater separation of
church and state, or for broader accommodation of the Author’s specific beliefs. This analysis does not imply that intelligent design
should be taught in public schools, and neither does it compel the
denial of state-funded vouchers for religious education. Which practices should be prohibited and which permitted is a policy question
well beyond the scope of this Comment.
This Comment will only set forth the logically necessary consequences of the statements and rulings of the Court. If we accept
these statements and rulings as premises, then in some circumstances
we must inevitably conclude that the Court has passed judgment on
the substance of individual beliefs. This plain reliance on logic is
beneficial, for it removes from the ultimate conclusions any partisan
flavor that could otherwise be insinuated. If the argument form is
valid and all premises are agreed upon, then the conclusions here

private statement by a majority of nine federal judges. Rather, this implicit assertion
is particularly significant because it necessarily follows from the Court’s judgment;
that is, the implicit assertion has as much force as the judgment itself.
9
406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court granted the Amish plaintiffs an exemption to
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law where their religious beliefs required less
formal education than the law demanded. Id. at 207, 234–35.
10
494 U.S. 872 (1990). In denying Native Americans the right to ingest peyote, a
controlled substance, for religious purposes, the Court held that facially neutral laws
of general applicability are presumptively valid against Free Exercise challenges. Id.
at 879–80.
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drawn ought to be equally amenable to the liberal and the conservative, the Hindu and the Mormon, the Scalia and the Souter.
Part II will begin with a brief survey of how the Supreme Court’s
policy of not evaluating the truth of religious beliefs is interwoven
with its principle of neutrality toward religion. Part III will state the
fundamental assumptions undergirding the Comment and set forth
its formal argument, which is grounded in propositional logic. Examples and illustrations will be provided where appropriate. Part IV
will apply the formal argument to key cases in the Supreme Court’s
Free Exercise jurisprudence, and clarify the scope of the thesis. Part
V will rebut foreseeable objections to the argument. Part VI will address some of the practical and philosophical implications of the argument.
II. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE
POLICY AGAINST JUDGING THE TRUTH OF RELIGIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States has continually relied
on a policy of governmental neutrality toward religion in the First
Amendment Religion Clause cases it has decided over the last sixty
11
years, even though it has never offered an explicit definition of the
term “neutrality.” In the absence of an express definition of neutrality, the term has taken on diverse, contextualized meanings, such that
both those Justices who favor separation of church and state and
those who favor accommodation of religion all declare, at least
12
This ambiguity of
nominally, that their interpretation is neutral.
definition and irregularity of application have caused great consternation for courts and commentators alike, many of whom have ar13
gued for the superiority of one form of neutrality to another. Nev-

11
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (first announcing the neutrality
principle).
12
See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80 (Scalia, J.) (holding that facially neutral laws
of general applicability are presumptively valid); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970) (Burger, C.J.) (adopting the idea of “benevolent neutrality” when holding that a New York tax exemption for religious organizations did not violate the Establishment Clause).
13
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–84 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between three uses of neutrality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and arguing against formal neutrality and in favor of secular neutrality);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397–98 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the inconsistent application of the Court’s Lemon
test for Establishment Clause violations); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1018 (1990) (distinguishing between three uses of neutrality in religion jurisprudence, and favoring
the idea of substantive neutrality).
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ertheless, all agree that, however defined, neutrality is a value to be
sought after in government interaction with religion.
The Supreme Court first announced the principle of neutrality
14
in 1947 in the case of Everson v. Board of Education. At issue was
whether New Jersey’s reimbursement to Catholic school students for
school transportation costs was a violation of the First Amendment as
15
a law respecting the establishment of religion. In an opinion con16
sidered to be the first modern Establishment Clause decision, the
Court used strong, now-famous language setting forth the principles
of what the government may and may not do:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
17
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.

Some of this language would seem almost antagonistic to religion, but the Court also made clear that the First Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
18
Concluding that not allowing the program would
adversary.”
amount to hostility toward religion, the Court found no Establish19
ment Clause violation, but decided so by a five-to-four margin. Everson’s dissenters would not necessarily have adopted a different rationale, but only a different result; the dissenting opinions of Justices
Jackson and Rutledge actually placed more emphasis on neutrality
20
than the majority opinion.
Neutrality, in one sense or another, has continued to be a key
component of the Court’s analysis in subsequent Religion Clause
cases. Five years after Everson, the Court ruled that a program where
students were permitted to leave school for religious education was
not a violation of the Establishment Clause, stating that “[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between
14

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 8.
16
See Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 33, 46 (2000).
17
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
18
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
19
Id. at 18, 28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
20
See id. at 18–28 (stating that the American education system is premised on the
idea that a school can “maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion”); id. at 28–
63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (using variations of the root word “neutral” three times).
The majority used the word “neutral” only once. See id. at 1–18 (majority opinion).
15
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21

sects.” In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court, permitting an exemption for
the Amish to compulsory education laws, stated that “[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the
22
free exercise of religion.” In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
23
City of Hialeah, the Court held that:
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is nar24
rowly tailored to advance that interest.

The Supreme Court’s policy of not judging the truth of a religion is intimately bound up in the principle of governmental neutrality toward religion. United States v. Ballard was the first case to clearly
state that the Court will not inquire into the truth of an individual’s
25
beliefs in evaluating a Free Exercise claim. Though Ballard was decided in 1944, three years before the neutrality principle was first expressed in Everson, the Court retroactively imputed the neutrality
principle to the Ballard decision when it decided School District of
26
Abington Township v. Schempp in 1963:
The mandate of judicial neutrality in theological controversies
met its severest test in United States v. Ballard. That decision put in
sharp relief certain principles which bear directly upon the questions presented in these cases. . . . We said: “Man’s relation to his
God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right
to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of
his religious views.” . . . “[I]t would hardly be supposed that they
could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining
whether those teachings contained false representations.” . . .
[Ballard] shows how elusive is the line which enforces the Amend27
ment’s injunction of strict neutrality . . . .

This use of backwards application is hardly a strained construction. Though the Ballard Court did not expressly set forth the principle of neutrality, many of the same members of the Ballard Court

21

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (emphasis added).
406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (emphasis added).
23
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (facially neutral law shown to have been enacted to burden the practice of Santeria violated the Free Exercise Clause).
24
Id. at 533 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
25
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
26
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
27
Id. at 244–45 (quoting Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87).
22
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28

were present for the Everson decision, which brought Ballard’s Free
Exercise reasoning into an Establishment Clause context and first
announced the neutrality principle. Ballard’s no-inquiry policy has
been expressly preserved in later case law, together with the familiar
29
neutrality principle.
III. FORMAL ARGUMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
This Comment argues, simply on the basis of deductive logic,
that in certain circumstances the Court necessarily implies that an individual’s religious beliefs are untrue. Because this argument is deductive, its persuasive value cannot be questioned by doubting the
connection between the premises and the conclusion, but only by
doubting the truth of the premises. The premises are few, and they
are meant to be essentially self-evident. These premises include the
Court’s statements of legal principles in Free Exercise jurisprudence,

28

Seven members of the Ballard Court were present for the Everson decision; Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Stone were replaced with Justice Burton and Chief Justice Vinson. See SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2007), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/mem
bers.pdf.
29
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in
many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (noting in dicta that judicial inquiry
into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is prohibited); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). In Seeger, a conscientious objector case, the Court held
that “[t]he validity of what [respondent] believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question . . . the truth of
his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government.” Id.
Walz v. Tax Commission provides a further illustration of the unity of the noinquiry policy and the neutrality principle. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In that case, a
property owner in New York contended that the Tax Commission’s grant of exemptions for church property indirectly required him to make a donation to religious
bodies and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 667. The Court found
it unnecessary to justify the religious tax exemption on grounds of the good works of
social welfare programs that religious organizations provide for the community: “To
give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.” Id. at 674. The unity of
the two policies is clear here. The neutrality principle declares that the government
is not even to consider judging a religion by the social benefits it offers because this
would come too near to evaluating the truth of the religion itself. It is also worth
noting that rather than evaluating the merits of specific religious claims, the Court
stated that religious organizations are presumptively considered socially valuable:
“The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this [tax exemption] useful, desirable, and in the public interest.” Id. at 673.
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the statements of the individuals’ religious beliefs in those cases, and
the rulings and results in those cases. Any meaningful analysis of the
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution must begin with this much.
30
This Comment also makes two fundamental assumptions. Because
these assumptions are critical to the argument, a few words in their
defense are in order.
First, if an individual thinks a proposition is objectively true, that
individual sincerely believes the proposition. This assumption may
seem axiomatic, or even merely semantic, but perhaps some readers
are uncomfortable thinking about objective truth in the religious
31
context. However, most of us would readily acknowledge this axiom
in areas where we frequently speak of objective truth—mathematics,
for instance, which is objectively true. If we think “2 + 2 = 4” is true,
we believe that 2 + 2 = 4. An individual may rationally doubt even his
own existence, but he may not rationally doubt such truths, for they
32
are themselves founded in reason. In any case, whether as a redundant matter of linguistics or as a necessity of logic, the assumption
holds—if an individual thinks a proposition objectively true, the only
33
rational response is to believe that proposition.
30
There is a third necessary assumption to the argument—that the Supreme
Court operates in a rational and logical manner. Given that the American legal system is premised upon reasoning and argument, the validity of that assumption is not
difficult to substantiate, and though the Court may sometimes fail in rationality,
there would likely be few of us who would assert that rationality is not at least an aspirational ideal for our courts. See infra Part V.B.
31
As for objective truth in religion, it is less important for purposes of the discussion here whether a given religion is objectively true, but rather that it claims to be.
Indeed, most of the major world religions (and many of the minor ones) do claim to
be objectively true. See, e.g., AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR’AN 32:2–3 (Majid Fakhry
trans., New York University Press 2004) (est. c. seventh century A.D.) (stating that the
Qur’an is the truth from Allah); John 14:6 (Revised Standard Version) (“Jesus said to
him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by
me.’”); JOSEPH SMITH, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1:30–33 (1886) (stating that the Mormon church is the only
church with which God is pleased). We might even assume that it is because adherents believe a religion to be objectively true that they choose to follow it, perhaps
even, as in the case of martyrs, kamikazes, and suicide bombers, against their immediate interest in self-preservation. Many adherents would perhaps choose ways of life
other than the one commanded by their religion if they felt that the truth was something they could simply choose. Whether the reader believes it possible for any religion to be objectively true is not of particular significance here, for this discussion is
limited to those religious adherents who claim their religion is objectively true.
32
See GEORGE BOOLE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT ON WHICH ARE
FOUNDED THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PROBABILITIES 1–23 (Dover Publications 1958) (1854).
33
The converse of this assumption, that if an individual believes a proposition
the individual thinks the proposition objectively true, is probably not correct. Many
of us believe things by default, things that we would simply like to think are true, or
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Second, if one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon
34
that belief. Also axiomatic, this assumption is expressed in such colloquialisms as “talk is cheap, put your money where your mouth is,”
or religious statements such as “[s]how me your faith apart from your
35
works, and I by my works will show you my faith.” A skydiver shows
that he really believes in the safety of the parachute when he jumps
out of the plane, and a social reformer proves she cares for the homeless when she goes out on the streets to help them. We may doubt
the mere words, dreams, or wishful thinking of either the skydiver or
the social reformer, for apart from action, speech and thought are of
36
dubious sincerity.
The simple conditional modus tollens is the center of this Comment’s formal argument. Modus tollens is an inherently valid logical
37
form that, in propositional form, proceeds as follows:
things that we dimly suspect are true, none of which are supported by any claim to
objective truth. The perception of objective truth is a sufficient condition to belief,
but it is not a necessary condition.
34
This is perhaps implicit in Religion Clause jurisprudence. For instance, the
sincerity requirement shows that for an action to be protected, it must stem from
genuine belief. See, e.g., Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184 (interpreting a religious belief exemption to the Selective Service in an Act of Congress); DANIEL O. CONKLE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 82 (2003) (“For conduct to qualify as
the exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause, the conduct must, at a
minimum, be conduct that is sincerely motivated by religious beliefs.”). Second, it
should also be noted that the clause itself protects not just the belief, but the exercise
of religion—the actions that of necessity flow from the belief. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
35
James 2:18.
36
A strong critique could be leveled against this assumption based on the concept of sin, which could be defined as acting contrary to the behavior compelled by
one’s beliefs. The critique would state that because people sin, it is not true that if
one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon the proposition. However, this
assumption may yet be defended on three grounds. First, the assumption may be defended as a circular tautology—if an individual sins, it shows that the individual did
not really believe what he said he believed; he at least did not believe it in the moment of the sin. This defense makes sense and offers philosophical consistency, but
it is not supported by anything other than its mere statement and the insistence on
the assumption as a tautology. Second, one may argue that all sin inherently
amounts to a logical contradiction, because it involves acting contrary to the behavior commanded by a moral authority. Thus to the extent that the American government, the Supreme Court, and the reader presuppose reason as a fundamental
authority, there should be no allowance for sin, that is, for actions contrary to the
logic and reason in which our government is presumably grounded. Third, it may be
conceded that sin is a counterexample to this assumed proposition but that, in any
event, the government should not be sinning. See infra notes 141–47 and accompanying text.
37
See JAMES B. NANCE & DOUGLAS J. WILSON, INTRODUCTORY LOGIC 191–92 (4th ed.
2006). In an inherently valid argument, if we assume the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true. Id. at 129.
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If P then Q.
Not Q, therefore not P. 38

The following is an example of modus tollens using sentences with
concrete nouns:
If it is a squirrel, then it is a rodent.
It is not a rodent, therefore it is not a squirrel. 39

Finally, here is a version of modus tollens most relevant to the discussion here:
If one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it.
One doesn’t act upon the proposition, therefore one does not sincerely believe it.

The modus tollens argument form may also be validly sequenced
with another modus tollens to create two major premises as follows:
If P then Q.
If Q then R.
Not R, therefore not P. 40

Or, as in the discussion here:
If one thinks a proposition is objectively true, then one sincerely believes it.
If one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it.
One does not act upon the proposition, therefore one does not think it is objectively true.

This Comment posits that when the Supreme Court denies an
individual’s Free Exercise claim, and the individual’s governmentrestricted action is a necessary consequence of the individual’s belief
in a universal objective truth, the Supreme Court implicitly asserts
that the individual’s belief is not true. A hypothetical will illustrate
how this thesis fits into the modus tollens argument form.
Suppose that the religion of Wilsonism teaches that everyone
who wishes to be saved must disobey traffic signals. Tim thinks Wilsonism is objectively true, so he believes this doctrine. Tim wants to
be saved, so he knows he needs to disobey traffic signals. The government’s laws, however, require that all citizens obey traffic signals.
Tim therefore petitions a court for an exemption to the law on the
ground of the Free Exercise Clause. Because the court finds that the
compelling interest of traffic signal enforcement outweighs Tim’s
41
Free Exercise Claim, it refuses to grant Tim’s exemption. To wit,
38

Id. at 191–92.
See id.
40
See id. at 189.
41
This is a crucial point in the argument. The Court does not care about the individual’s belief as long as that belief produces action consistent with government
policy—in other words, where the individual’s actions harmonize with the actions
39
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the court will not permit anyone to take the specific action that Wilsonism commands for all of humanity. Therefore the court does not
think Wilsonism is true.
Close scrutiny reveals one important difference between the
propositional version of the modus tollens argument above and the
subsequent “Wilsonism” hypothetical. In the former, an individual’s
failure to act on a belief shows that the individual does not think the
belief true, where in the latter the court’s denial of the individual’s
right to practice shows that the court does not think the individual’s
belief is true. Normally this would be fatal to the argument, because
42
the use of terms is not consistent; indeed, it would appear to be a
subtle equivocation of sorts. However, there is no logical problem
here because no switch in terms results when the individual’s truth
claim is universal. Where a truth claim is universal, its proponents
and adherents assert that the truth applies to the court just as much
as to the individual. Where the individual’s belief is based on a claim
to a universal objective truth, the court’s denial of the individual’s right
to practice implies that the court has judged the belief false. In the
hypothetical, Wilsonism claims that even the court itself, for its own
salvation and that of its members, should not obey traffic signals. Because the underlying truth claim is universal, the court’s refusal to
permit the individual’s religious practice is functionally and logically
the same as when an individual refuses to perform the action required by the belief. Consequently, the court’s denial carries the
same implicit assertion of falsity as the individual refusal.
The Wilsonism hypothetical may seem absurd to the reader; it
would seem to be the sort of strange example that the Court would
rarely encounter in practice. However, religions have claimed far
stranger things, and commanded actions far more loathsome to socicommanded by the government’s beliefs, we do not have a problem. It becomes difficult when the government action and the individual action are mutually exclusive—
here, obeying traffic signals and disobeying traffic signals. Thus, the implicit assertion of falsity only occurs when the Free Exercise claim is denied.
42
To understand why this could be a problem, consider the modus tollens form
used above:
If P then Q. If Q then R. Not R, therefore not P.
If one thinks a proposition is objectively true, then one sincerely believes it. If one
sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it. One does not act upon the
proposition, therefore one does not think it is true.
NANCE & WILSON, supra note 37, at 189–93. When we replace the statement that the
individual does not act upon the belief (not-R) with the court’s refusal to allow the
individual to act upon the belief, we would appear to have a swap in terms (not-R has
been changed), which renders the argument logically invalid. However, the universality of the individual’s belief makes this moot, as addressed in the text following
this note above.
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43

ety. Were the Supreme Court to uphold traffic signal enforcement
against the contrary claims of Wilsonism, few of us would contend
that the Court made the wrong decision on policy; we do not think
the universal religious claim of a minority should be allowed to subvert laws beneficial to society. At the same time, perhaps we are uncomfortable with the Court implicitly declaring a religion false. Nev44
ertheless, because of logic, we simply cannot have it both ways.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARGUMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT’S
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Reynolds v. United States

45

The Supreme Court first decided a Free Exercise claim in Rey46
nolds v. United States, an 1878 case on a writ of error to the Supreme
47
Court of the Utah Territory. The petitioner, Reynolds, had been
48
indicted for the crime of bigamy. Reynolds was a member of the
Mormon Church, which declared that the practice of polygamy was
commanded by several sacred books and by the revelations of Al49
mighty God to Joseph Smith. According to the church, failure to
43
Consider for instance the Heaven’s Gate cult, where cult leader Herff Applewhite convinced thirty-nine followers to commit mass suicide with promises that they
would be taken away by a UFO behind the Hale-Bopp comet in 1997. See Evan Thomas et al., The Next Level, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1997, at 28. Consider also that ritual
human sacrifice in worship of the goddess Kali continues in India, though only as a
fringe practice. See Alex Perry Atapur, Killing for “Mother” Kali, TIME—ASIA, July 9,
2002, at 17, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,322
673,00.html.
44
An alternate way to structure this formal argument is to conceive of the
church-state conflict as a conflict between the normative statements of two authorities. Suppose a given religion, laying claim to a universal, objective truth, teaches
that everyone should do X, while the government forbids everyone from doing X
(which carries the implicit normative command that one should not do X). If an individual brings a Free Exercise claim based upon his religion’s command to do X
and the government denies his claim, the government has implicitly stated that the
religion’s claim (“everyone should do X”) is false. At the very least, the government,
by enforcing its normative commands rather than the commands of the religion, has
stated that the religion is not a real authority over the government, and thus denied
the religion’s inherent claims to sovereignty, supremacy, and transcendence. While
this argument form is somewhat simpler and more clear than the form used in the
body of this Comment, it does not result in as clear an assertion of the religion’s falsity because it is not as founded in the nature of epistemology. It is thus only briefly
noted here.
45
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
46
Id.
47
See id. at 153.
48
Id. at 161.
49
Id.
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practice polygamy when given an opportunity to do so was damna50
ble. Reynolds therefore contended that the verdict in his case could
only be “not guilty” because he had practiced polygamy out of a sin51
cere belief in a religious duty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that a prohibition of
bigamy must be outside the scope of the Religion Clauses, because
bigamy had long been criminal—it was prohibited at the time the
First Amendment was adopted, at the time Madison wrote his famous
52
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, and even un53
der the lesser religious liberty protections of England. Additionally,
the Court found that marriage, though sacred, was also a secular matter, and that the practice of bigamy led to unsavory social results:
“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and . . . when applied
to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism
54
. . . .”
The Court also held that the non-enforcement of a law
against an individual because of a private belief would essentially lead
to anarchy:
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circum55
stances.

Consequently, the Court held that Reynolds’s sincere religious belief
in the necessity of bigamy would not absolve him of violating the
56
law.
57
The Mormon Church lays claim to universal, objective truth.
By purported revelation from God, the Mormon Church claimed at

50

Id.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–62.
52
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
reprinted in JAMES MADISON, THE COMPLETE MADISON 299 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
53
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164–65.
54
Id. at 166.
55
Id. at 166–67. This prompts an interesting question: Is the essence of government that it may compel the citizen to do something he or she does not believe in?
This may be in accord with Max Weber’s definition of the state as the monopoly of
legitimate use of physical force. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 154 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Free Press 1997)
(1947).
56
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168.
57
See JOSEPH SMITH, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1:30–33 (1886).
51
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its founding to be the only church with which God was pleased. In
the Lord’s Preface to The Doctrine and Covenants, God declares to all
peoples that he who repents and follows the Church’s teachings will
be forgiven, but he who does not repent will have “the light which he
59
has received” taken from him. Events subsequent to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reynolds show that the Court correctly understood
the importance of the bigamy doctrine to the Mormon Church—
when the church, after the Reynolds decision, issued an Official Decla60
ration that it was no longer sanctioning or permitting bigamy, Mormon President Wilford Woodruff gave an address lamenting the great
spiritual cost at which the church had decided to discontinue the
61
practice.
All of these facts together, in conjunction with the logical form
laid out above, demonstrate the Court’s implicit assertion of the falsity of this Mormon belief. The Mormon Church, claiming to preach
truth to all humankind, had commanded the practice of bigamy as a
means of obtaining salvation. The Supreme Court, in upholding the
laws of the Utah Territory, refused to allow the practice of bigamy.
Because the universal teaching of the Mormon church was directed
to the Court as much as to any individual, the Court’s refusal to allow
the practice of bigamy was a denial of the verity of the spiritual belief
supporting the practice, and further, a denial that the purported
spiritual authority was objectively true. The denial amounted to an
implicit declaration that Mormonism, or at least its plural marriage
62
doctrine, was false. Modus tollens, Q.E.D.
This may be a cause for distress—we are uncomfortable that the
Court, ostensibly grounded in neutrality, would do something so far
58

Id.
Id. at 1:1–7, 30–33.
60
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, OFFICIAL DECLARATION 1
(1890).
61
Woodruff’s letter posed to the church this difficult question:
Which is the wisest course for the Latter-day Saints to pursue—to continue to attempt to practice plural marriage, with the laws of the nation
against it and the opposition of sixty millions of people . . . or, after doing and suffering what we have through our adherence to this principle to cease the practice and submit to the law, and through doing so
leave the Prophets, Apostles and fathers at home, so that they can instruct the people and attend to the duties of the Church, and also leave
the Temples in the hands of the Saints, so that they can attend to the
ordinances of the Gospel, both for the living and the dead?
Wilford Woodruff, President, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Address at
the Cache Stake Conference (Nov. 1, 1891), in DESERET WEEKLY, Nov. 14, 1891, available at http://scriptures.lds.org/od/1.
62
Quod erat demonstrandum (that which was to be shown).
59
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from neutral as to even insinuate that a religious doctrine is false. But
whether the conclusion is comfortable or not, it is logically necessary
from the premises.
B. Bob Jones University v. United States

63

In 1983, the Supreme Court confronted the Free Exercise issue
64
within the context of federal income tax exemptions. The IRS had
formerly permitted all religious or educational institutions to qualify
for tax-exempt status, with contributions to such institutions being
65
deductible. However, in 1970, the IRS changed its policy such that
it would no longer offer the tax benefit to institutions that practiced
racial discrimination, since these institutions could not be deemed
66
Bob Jones University is a Christian university whose
charitable.
sponsors believed (at the time of the litigation) that the Bible specifi67
cally forbade interracial dating and marriage. Because this policy
was discriminatory, the IRS revoked the university’s tax-exempt
68
status. The university brought an action for a refund in federal dis69
trict court, and the case ultimately came before the Supreme Court
70
of the United States via the university’s petition for certiorari.
Among the university’s various claims for the right to the tax exemption, the university asserted that the IRS regulation was a violation of the university’s right to free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment, because the university’s policy of racial discrimina71
tion was based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court dis72
agreed, reiterating the principle from United States v. Lee that the
First Amendment’s prohibition of restrictions on religious liberty was
63

461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Id. at 602–03.
65
Id. at 577–78; I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1954) (declaring specified institutions
tax exempt); I.R.C. § 170 (1954) (making contributions to specified institutions deductible).
66
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577–78, 582. Though the language of § 501(c)(3)
was disjunctive for religious, educational, or charitable organizations, inter alia, the
Fourth Circuit held that the exemption had to be read against the background of
charitable trust law, requiring an organization to be charitable. Id. at 582 (citing Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980)). Because racial discrimination was not charitable, institutions that practiced it could not qualify for the
exemption. Id.
67
Bob Jones Univ., 464 U.S. at 580.
68
Id. at 581.
69
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978).
70
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (granting certiorari
along with companion case, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States).
71
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602.
72
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
64
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73

not absolute. Indeed, a restriction may be justified if it is necessary
74
The Court deto effectuate a compelling governmental interest.
clared that the “governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of
75
Further compelling interest analysis retheir religious beliefs.”
vealed no less-restrictive alternative to the IRS regulation, nor any
76
room for accommodation of the university’s discriminatory practice.
Consequently, the Free Exercise claim failed against the valid regula77
tion.
Bob Jones University declares itself to be dedicated to Christian
78
principles, grounding all of its courses in instruction from the Bible.
Bob Jones University does not maintain these beliefs privately, as
though the truth only applies to the university, but rather believes
that the Bible and its teachings are universally and objectively binding
79
on all of humanity. The university’s belief in the Scriptural prohibition of interracial dating and marriage was strong enough that it instituted a ban of those practices on its campus and punished by expulsion both those who violated the ban and those who encouraged
80
violation. The Court even conceded that the discriminatory prac-

73

Id. at 257–58 (denying an exception to the Social Security system for Amish
persons and holding that free exercise protection is not absolute).
74
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603.
75
Id. at 604.
76
Id.
77
Id. Neither did any of the university’s other claims prevail. The Fourth Circuit’s decision was affirmed, and tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University was denied. Id. at 605. It should be noted, however, that Bob Jones University has survived
despite its lack of a tax exemption, and also that it dropped its discriminatory policies
abruptly in 2000 per an announcement on Larry King Live. Susannah Meadows,
Passing the Torch at Bob Jones U., MSNBC.COM/NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2005, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/6884040/site/newsweek/.
78
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579–81.
79
Bob Jones University’s philosophy statement emphasizes the institution’s “adherence to the Bible as mankind’s only source of faith and Christian practice.” Bob
Jones University, University Mission and Philosophy, http://www.bju.edu/about/
mission.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). The statement also affirms the idea that belief is evidenced by action:
Biblical values are integrated in every classroom and every other part of
the educational process. . . . Christian professors and staff members
encourage students by precept and example to a lifelong commitment to
learning, teaching, and exemplifying spiritual truths. The founder’s philosophy that BJU is not here just to teach men and women how to
make a living, but more importantly, how to live, remains our focus.
Id. (emphasis added).
80
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579–81.

WILSON_FINALV2

2008]

4/11/2008 2:20:56 PM

COMMENT

731

tices of the university stemmed from a “genuine belief that the Bible
81
forbids interracial dating and marriage.”
If the Supreme Court, as agent of our government, actually believed that Almighty God universally prohibited interracial dating and
marriage, it certainly would not have upheld the IRS regulation—
rather, it would have acted in accordance with its belief, and found
for Bob Jones. How could the Court uphold a tax regulation that
punished those who followed the will of the omnipotent Creator?
But because the Supreme Court upheld the IRS regulation, and did
not act in accordance with University’s claim to objective truth, the
Court showed that it did not believe the dogma of Bob Jones University was correct. The Court implicitly declared that the university’s
82
claim to universal objective truth was false. It may not have stated so
expressly, but the logical implications cannot be avoided. In the end,
we may think the Court ruled correctly on the Constitution, civil
rights, and tax policy, but, however good the policy, can a ruling that
passes even implicit judgment on a religion be called anything like
neutral?
C.

Native American Religion Cases

The Supreme Court also decided several significant Free Exer83
cise cases involving Native American religion, two of which will be
discussed here. These cases are significant because in both cases the
Court admitted it was substantially restricting the religious liberty of a
minority religion, but purported to do so without either violating the
principle of neutrality, or passing any kind of judgment on the un84
derlying belief. Nevertheless, by the stipulated facts and the ruling,
the Court implied the opposite.

81

Id. at 603 n.28.
When a religious belief conflicts with a secular law, the Court is obligated to
decide on the basis of the secular law. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
67 (1878). It could be argued that a decision on this basis only shows that policy
supporting the secular law is “more” true than the religious belief, not that the religious belief is affirmatively false. However, the concept of comparative truth will not
serve us here where the secular law and the religious belief are in direct conflict, that
is, where the law prohibits what the religion requires or vice versa. If we grant that
the policy supporting the secular law is “more” true, then the contradictory religious
belief is therefore false.
83
Of these three significant cases, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), which pertains to a Free Exercise claim for avoidance of having a number imposed by the Social Security administration, will be addressed later. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
84
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–90 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445–58 (1988).
82
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In 1977, the United States Forest Service prepared to complete a
stretch of road between the California towns of Gasquet and Orleans
by laying down pavement on a six-mile segment that was previously
85
unpaved.
As part of its preparation, the Forest Service commis86
sioned an impact study of the consequences of developing the road.
The study found that the entire area “‘is significant as an integral and
indispensible [sic] part of Indian religious conceptualization and
practice[,] . . . [and] successful use of the [area] is dependent upon
and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the
most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed
87
Construction of the proposed road, the study
natural setting.’”
found, “‘would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems
88
and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.’”
However, the Forest Service chose not to follow the study’s recommendation that the road not be completed and instead proceeded
89
with construction plans. Individuals and groups of Native Americans, as well as various environmental groups and the State of Cali90
fornia, sued to enjoin the construction of the road. The case came
before the Supreme Court a decade later as Lyng v. Northwest Indian
91
Cemetery Protective Association.
Before discussing the merits of the case, the Court noted that
“[i]t is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere
and that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse
92
effects on the practice of their religion.” The Court also expressly
denied that it was evaluating the truth of the Native Americans’
claims: “This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying be93
liefs that led to the religious objections here . . . .” Additionally, the
Court declined to adopt the dissent’s proffered rule, which required
an evaluation of how central a sincerely held belief was to a particular
claimant’s religion, because such a standard would require the Court
“to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own reli94
gious beliefs.”
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
Id.
Id. (quoting Forest Service study).
Id.
Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 443.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443–45.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 458.
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Despite its acknowledgment of the damage that the construction
of the road would do to the Native American religion, the Court
95
ruled for the Forest Service.
It stated that “[t]he Free Exercise
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the reli96
gious beliefs of particular citizens.” The Court also noted that the
central principle of the First Amendment was a restriction on what
government may do to the individual, not what the individual may
97
demand of the government. The Court provided as a policy rationale that:
However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires. A broad range of government
activities—from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects—will always be considered essential to the spiritual
well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs . . . . The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public pro98
grams that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion.
99

Having articulated the weight of the religious issues at stake,
but realizing the negative policy precedent that a favorable ruling for
100
the Native Americans would set, the Court reversed the ruling of
the Ninth Circuit, which had favored the Native Americans, and remanded for reconsideration of the injunction in light of the Court’s
101
holding and other relevant events.
The religious claim asserted by the Native Americans was both
universal and objective—the groups appealed not only to the inter102
ests of the tribe, but of all humanity: “Individual practitioners use
this area for personal spiritual development; some of their activities

95

Id. at 458.
Id. at 448 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (denying American
Indian father exception to Social Security policy on the basis of his religious belief
where he sought to avoid having a number assigned to his two-year-old daughter)).
97
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
98
Id. at 452.
99
Even if the construction of the road would “virtually destroy the . . . Indians’
ability to practice their religion,” as the Ninth Circuit suggested, the Constitution
provided no remedy for the claimants. Id. at 451–52 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1985)).
100
“No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of
public property.” Id. at 453.
101
Id. at 458.
102
Id. at 451.
96
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are believed to be critically important in advancing the welfare of the
103
Tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself.”
Regardless of the policy behind this case—whether it was decided correctly under the First Amendment, whether it adequately
protects the environment, or whether it offers sufficient protection
from the impositions of religious minorities—there can be no dispute
about what the ruling is logically saying. If, as the Native Americans
claimed, it was in the best spiritual interests of mankind, based on divine mandate, to keep the proposed construction site clear, then the
government would be utterly foolish to clearcut for the sake of a
mere road. More to the point, if the Court really believed in the spiritual necessity of preserving the area, the Court would not have ruled
as it did. But it did rule as it did, and therefore the Court did not believe the religious claim of the Native Americans. The Court implied
by its ruling that at least this aspect of Native American religion was
quite simply false.
What is perhaps most interesting about Lyng is that the Court
expressly denied that it evaluates the truth of religions. Some would
perhaps suggest that this express statement should cut against the
implicit analysis set forth here. However, this Comment submits that
the force of logic and the eventual result of the road’s construction
carry much more weight than the Court’s dicta stating the contrary.
The majority criticized the proffered test of the dissent, which would
have evaluated the centrality of a particular doctrine to a religion, because the test required the Court to rule that it understood a religion
104
better then its adherents did. But setting aside whatever merits the
dissent’s position may have had, the pitfalls of its test are probably not
as offensive as the Court’s insinuation of the falsity of a group’s beliefs; the majority’s jurisprudence would not even give the individual
a substantive hearing as to the grounds of his belief, but would nonetheless declare it false.
105
The Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
another case pertaining to Native American religion, has perplexed
commentators and redefined interpretation of the Free Exercise
106
Clause. The respondents, Smith and Black, were two Native Americans who were fired from their jobs at a drug rehab center because
103

Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
Id. at 457–58.
105
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
106
See, e.g., Thomas F. Lamacchia, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEO. L.J.
117, 120–39 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme
Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259.
104
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they used peyote, a controlled substance.
They thereafter sought
unemployment compensation, which was denied because their dis108
Before the Supreme
charge was for work-related misconduct.
Court was the question of whether the First Amendment permitted
109
denial of unemployment compensation for religious drug use. The
Court ultimately held that because Oregon’s unemployment provisions were facially neutral laws of general applicability, they were valid
even without a sacramental exception for peyote use, and the denial
110
of unemployment benefits to Smith and Black could stand.
The Court’s opinion in Smith does not reveal whether Smith and
Black asserted that their religious use of peyote stemmed from belief
111
in a universal truth. However, one of the lower court opinions earlier on in Smith’s procedural history notes that “[Black] testified that
he was not required by the [Native American] church to take peyote,
112
The absence of a religious rebut that it was a personal decision.”
quirement to ingest peyote cuts against a finding that the use of peyote was a universal mandate of the Native American religion. Since
the universality of the religious claim is an essential element of the
113
argument in this Comment, the lack of a universal claim in Smith
means there was no implicit assertion by the Court that Smith’s and
Black’s beliefs were untrue. However, Smith is significant not merely
for its holding regarding Smith’s and Black’s use of peyote, but for its
broader implications, for Smith holds that laws of general applicability
are presumed valid, despite that they may burden individual religious
114
practice.
If a law and an objective and universal religious belief command
contradictory modes of conduct, one or the other must fall. The
government restriction may be withdrawn or amended, or the religious adherent may be forced to cease practice, but there will be no
peaceful coexistence. Because the religious action stems from belief
in a universal, objective truth, and the law presumably stems from the
government’s policy beliefs, resolving the dispute between religious
observance and governmental action will either implicitly assert that

107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 872–74.
Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
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the religious belief is false, or that the contrary governmental policy is
not as important as it was first claimed.
Smith declares that facially neutral laws of general applicability
are presumptively valid, and need provide no exception for contrary
115
religious practices.
Before Smith, the Court was more ready to find
that the religious interest could be reconciled with governmental pol116
icy through an exception, but post-Smith, where the governmental
action is presumptively valid, the contradictory religious claim generally will not stand. Logic then leads us to the implicit holding of
Smith: if an action contradictory to generally applicable law is premised on belief in a universal, objective truth, the substance of that belief is presumptively false. Thus presumptively valid state action often
amounts to presumptively false religion.
The Smith doctrine is very difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile
with the policy of governmental neutrality toward religion in which it
117
is ostensibly grounded.
The Court adopted as a rule of decision a
footnote from United States v. Lee, that “the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro118
scribes).’”
Douglas Laycock, discussing the different uses of the
term “neutrality” in Supreme Court Religion Clause jurisprudence,
criticizes the Smith doctrine, which he calls “formal neutrality,” noting
119
that it can often be discriminatory and lead to absurd results. However, even more significant than Laycock’s policy objection to the
115

Id.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting an exception for
the Amish to compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(mandating payment of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarian in face of contrary
state law).
117
In the public outcry after Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which required government action that substantially
burdened a religious practice to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2000)). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–36 (1997), the Court
held that the original version of RFRA violated principles of federalism and was unconstitutional as applied to the States, which prompted Congress to revise RFRA appropriately. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000). For the purposes of the discussion
here, it is not so much important what the specific law or standard of review for religious issues is, but rather that the judicial decrees in the cases discussed here imply a
statement that the religious belief in question is false. Regardless of whether Reynolds
or Lyng would be binding precedent today, we know that in the context of their time,
the cases delivered this implicit message; that in itself should be cause for concern.
118
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)).
119
Laycock, supra note 13, at 999–1001.
116
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Smith doctrine is that because of the doctrine, a “neutral” law of general applicability may be anything but—it may ultimately pass judgment on the truth of religion, which is hardly reconcilable with any
definition of neutral. In Smith, the Court cited Ballard and carefully
noted that the government may not “punish the expression of reli120
gious doctrines it believes to be false” —but merely by punishing the
individual’s doctrinal expression in action, the Court declares the doctrines false, violating Ballard inadvertently.
D. Exceptions
Though the Court has made implicit judgments of the truth of
particular religions in the cases and circumstances set forth above, it
is not this Comment’s contention that the Court judges the truth of a
religion whenever it decides a Free Exercise case. When certain elements of the thesis are absent or otherwise changed, no implicit truth
judgment results.
First, the Court makes no implicit judgment of a religion’s truth
when it permits the religious practice to continue, either through an
exception or by declaring the government restriction void as uncon121
stitutional. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Amish sought an exception to a Wisconsin law that made education compulsory until age
sixteen, the Court held that a religious exception was proper because
the government’s asserted policy interest in the law was already ade122
quately served by Amish practice. Did the Court’s allowance of the
Amish religious practice constitute an implicit declaration that Amish
beliefs are true? Hardly—to suggest so would be the logical fallacy of
123
Therefore the implicit declaration only
affirming the consequent.
exists when the Free Exercise claim is denied, and it can only implicitly assert falsity, not truth. Indeed, the religious practices that the
government allows—whether Amish education, the Catholic mass, or
Muslim prayer—are permitted because they are consistent with govern-

120

Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88
(1944)).
121
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
122
Id. at 221–26. The Court held that the Amish did not foster ignorance and
were adequately equipped to participate in contemporary society and in the democratic process. Id. at 223–26.
123
“Affirming the consequent” is an invalid logical form, i.e., if the premises are
true, the conclusion is not necessarily true. The form goes as follows: If P then Q. Q,
therefore P. If it is a squirrel, then it is a rodent. It is a rodent, therefore it is a squirrel. See
NANCE & WILSON, supra note 37, at 191–92. Here, affirming the consequent looks
like this: If one believes the Amish religion, one permits its practices. The Court
permits Amish practices, therefore it believes the Amish religion.
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124

ment policy, not because the government believes all of these religions are true. A wide variety of beliefs may be consistent with observing the law, but these beliefs are not thereby endorsed by the law because of this consistency. Tolerance is not approval.
Second, no implicit assertion of falsity results from the Court’s
denial of a belief that the adherent does not claim to be universal. In
125
Bowen v. Roy, Stephen J. Roy, a Native American, protested the use
of a Social Security number for his daughter, Little Bird of the Snow
Roy, because he believed the use of the number would rob her of her
126
The Supreme Court ruled that the Social Security Adminispirit.
stration’s effort to impose and use a number for Little Bird of the
127
Snow did not violate the Free Exercise clause.
Roy made no assertion (on record) that the imposition of a Social Security number
robbed everyone of their spirits, i.e., Roy did not state that this pur128
ported truth applied to anyone other than Little Bird of the Snow.
Had he made such an assertion, the Court’s denial of his religious
exception would, in his view, amount to the robbery of the souls of
every American citizen. In such a hypothetical case, the Court’s denial of the claim would have implied that the Court did not believe
the Social Security system was mass soul robbery. But because Roy’s
religious belief only applied to Little Bird of the Snow, the Court’s decision did not necessarily pass judgment on that belief. Namely, the
Court could still have actually agreed with Roy’s belief, and yet held,
albeit uncomfortably, that the public interest of uniform administration of Social Security outweighed the individual interest of the pro129
tection of Little Bird of the Snow’s soul.
Third, the Court makes no implicit assertion of falsity if the individual does not claim that the restricted practice is based on objective
truth. Where an individual maintains a religious belief and practice,
but also allows that other directly contradictory religious practices
may be equally valid or “true,” the argument fails, because propositional logic cannot be applied. Essentially, if the claimant admits that
“A and not-A” might be “true” in the realm of religion, there will be
no logical consequence to a restriction of the claimant’s religious
practice, because logic simply has no business with “A and not-A.”
124

Or perhaps not inconsistent with government policy.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
126
Id. at 695–98.
127
Id. at 712.
128
Id. at 695.
129
Perhaps this was a regulatory taking of the property interest of the soul, but
not such as would require compensation under the Takings Clause. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; see also, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 411–16 (1922).
125
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The individual may be offended by the Court’s restriction of his religious liberty, but he does not suffer an implicit assertion that his belief is false. While some readers may find sympathy with such subjective ideas of “truth,” the Court has yet to encounter a Free Exercise
130
claim premised on such an idea, and many major world religions
131
are founded on an idea of objective spiritual truth.
V. REBUTTAL
A.

No Express Judgment of Religious Beliefs

One might argue that the thesis of this Comment is without support because the Supreme Court has expressly declared that it does
not judge the truth of an individual’s religious belief when evaluating
132
But which is more significant here, the ultia Free Exercise claim.
mate result of a Free Exercise case, or the statements the Justices
make about what principles controlled the result? A man may make
earnest declarations of his love for his wife, but if he sleeps with other
women every night, we are inclined to suspect that his practice is
more controlling than his professions otherwise.
However, this is not to suggest that the Court privately articulates
definite decisions about religious truth, as though its deliberations in
Reynolds led the Justices to conclude Mormonism was false. This
Comment alleges no bad faith or ill will toward religion on the
Court’s part, but rather contends that the Court’s assertion of religious falsity is implicit, just below the surface. Indeed, because the
statement is implicit, many of the Justices may never have been cognizant of it. Few of us realize all the things our actions reveal about
our beliefs, but we cannot quarrel with logic. In fact, the Court’s di133
rect statements on the constitutional policy of not inquiring into
the truth of a religion actually lend greater importance to this Comment’s argument, for they disclose a hidden conflict between our
lofty legal policy and some rather inconvenient facts—this is a conflict that ought to be resolved.
130

That no party argues before the Court that his or her religion is merely subjectively true may indicate the diminished persuasive value of subjectivity and personal
opinion.
131
See supra note 31.
132
See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449
(1988); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
133
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (discussing “the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 244–45 (1963) (discussing the unity of the no-inquiry and neutrality
policies in Ballard).
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It might then be argued that the Court has at least followed its
policy of not making an inquiry per se into the truth of a religion. In
other words, assuming the thesis of this Comment is correct, and the
Court does make these implicit assertions of falsity, at least it never
puts a religion on trial to defend the empirical, rational, or legal mer134
its of its faith. It is true that a court would not put an Islamic cleric
on the stand to testify to the Qur’an’s divine inspiration, nor would it
135
make factual findings about the Catholic doctrine of ex cathedra.
But is this entirely a good thing? Which is worse, judging a religion
based on its merits as presented to the court, or judging it implicitly
without giving it an opportunity to be heard, and then denying that
any judgment was ever made? Granted, neither of these alternatives
is particularly appealing, but the first is at least self-consistent.
B. Government Regulates Action, but this Says Nothing About
Truth of Belief
It could also be argued that though the government may restrict
action, it may never restrict individual belief, and thus its denial of an
individual’s freedom of religious practice would not imply that the individual’s beliefs are false. Indeed, the Supreme Court has enunciated
this principle in some capacity: “Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is abso136
However,
lute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”
such a distinction will be fatal to the argument here only if its second
137
assumption (if you sincerely believe, then you act) is disproved. We
may intellectualize and posit the existence of a world where belief
could be meaningful without action, but rare would be the religion
that would concur. Even Protestant Christianity, which uniquely em138
phasizes the doctrine of sola fide (faith alone), affirms wholeheart139
edly the Scripture that “faith, if it has no works, is dead.” Not even
the Supreme Court itself will permit such a wall of separation—
consider its words in Wisconsin v. Yoder: “This case, therefore, does not
become easier because respondents were convicted for their ‘actions’
in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this
134

It could be argued, however, in such cases as Dover, where the court denied the
teaching of intelligent design in public schools based on the merits of the theory,
that the court has in effect put religion on the stand. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch.
Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
135
See, e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.
136
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
137
See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
138
See, e.g., Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XI (1646).
139
James 2:17.
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context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
140
Finally, the government clearly agrees as well, for
compartments.”
it expects a belief that is more than mental. It would be unlikely to
allow a citizen not to observe federal law simply because the citizen
believed that following federal law was a good idea. The state expects
obedience and not mere lip service; should not obedience be expected of the state?
But perhaps the action-belief connection may be criticized on
the basis of sin—if sin is when we know the law and believe the truth,
141
but we do not act accordingly, the second assumption of this Com142
ment is disproved by the fact of sin, for it is possible to believe
something sincerely without acting upon it. Sin, at least as a concept,
is something of which we are all aware, and perhaps the government
is, like all of us, simply human—that the government does not act on
a belief does not necessarily indicate that it does not hold the belief.
The assumption may nevertheless be defended on three principal grounds. The first two are relatively esoteric and philosophical,
143
and thus relegated to the footnotes.
The third is of practical im140
141

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
“Whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.” James

4:17.
142

If you believe, then you act. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
First, the assumption could be defended as a tautology, and therefore defended circularly. Sin may be an action not in accordance with a stated belief, or
with a previously held belief, but in the moment of the sin, the individual shows that
he does not really believe what he says he believes—otherwise he would not have
done it. If a Catholic genuinely believes that God will damn the adulterer, but commits adultery later, he shows that his belief did not hold firm in the moment of temptation, because no possible reward of adultery is greater than eternal punishment.
See, e.g., Proverbs 7:27 (saying of the adulteress that “[h]er house is the way to Sheol,
going down to the chambers of death”); DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 9–10
(Lawrence Grant White trans., Pantheon Books 1948) (1321) (condemning in Canto
V of the Inferno the lustful to the second circle of hell, though a reader could, in ruminating upon Dante’s glorification of Paolo and Francesca, conceivably desire such
a punishment more than paradise). Applying this understanding of sin to this argument, perhaps the Court does not generally disbelieve in the truth of the religions the
practice of which it prohibits, but only disbelieves them in the moment of its decisions. However, it would be strange that such behavior, neither noble nor predictable, should be bound up in the Court’s bedrock principle of neutrality.
Second, the assumption may be defended on the ground that sin ought to be
counted as inherently irrational. When an individual consciously sins by breaking
some moral law, that is, when he does what he knows he ought not do, he engages in
a kind of self-contradiction. He simultaneously affirms the authority of the lawgiver,
by granting it ought-ness, and denies that lawgiver’s authority, showing with his lawbreaking action that he believes the authority without power to punish him to the
point of deterrence. See C.S. LEWIS, MIRACLES 56–58 (HarperCollins 2001) (1947)
(offering a discussion of this ought-ness). Consider also the apostle Paul’s words in
the epistle to the Romans as an example of the irrationality of sin:
143
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portance here: what business does our government have with sinning? This is not asked to suggest that the government should conform itself to a particular notion of right and wrong, that is, to avoid
sin in the religious sense (it would thus become a theocracy), but
rather that the government should conform itself to what it believes.
If the government believes something, it should act accordingly; it
should not sin against its own acknowledged truths. If our govern144
ment is premised on the idea that all men are created equal, then
145
our governmental structure should reflect the premise, and our
146
courts should enforce the principle. In fact, much of legal scholarship (in which grand tradition this Comment hopes to continue) is
fundamentally concerned with getting the government to, in effect,
stop sinning—when an author writes a piece criticizing a decision of
the Court or a piece of legislation as unconstitutional or otherwise legally erroneous, the author is in effect saying that the government is
147
Perhaps this Comment may be atacting contrary to its beliefs.
tacked on the basis that the government is human and does not execute what it says it believes, but so can many other valid works of legal
scholarship. It may even be unrealistic to expect that the government
will ever stop “sinning,” but there is certainly value in working toward
that goal.

I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I
do the very thing I hate . . . . For I know that nothing good dwells
within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do
it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I
do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin
which dwells within me.
Romans 7:15–20.
Here, Paul is consumed by the sub-rational, instinctual force of sin, which compels him to do what he knows he ought not. Thus, to the extent that sin is inherently
irrational, it has no place in this argument and need not be accounted for, since this
Comment has presumed reason as a fundamental authority and ground of the discussion. This Comment will not quarrel with mere instinct. Further, as applied to
the issues here, if we assume the government’s “sin” is irrational, we would all readily
acknowledge this irrationality ought to be avoided.
144
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
145
See U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
146
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
147
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425–
27 (1987) (arguing the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and other decisions are inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty inherent in the Constitution); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1713–30 (2000) (criticizing some aspects of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic
Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1843 (2004).
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Finally, it is simply not meaningful to speak of the protection of
the freedom to believe apart from the freedom to act. The freedom
to believe is inviolable—while a government may compel an action, it
can only influence a belief. A government could endorse one religion
148
and condemn another, and a government could even force an in149
dividual to recant a belief under penalty of death —but to recant is
150
one thing, and to change one’s mind is quite another.
Recall the
words that Galileo supposedly muttered after he was forced to recant
151
We call
his heliocentric view of the universe: “And yet it moves.”
those who believe but do not act hypocrites, and thus the gracious
governmental “freedom” to believe and not to act is little more than
the freedom to be a hypocrite.
C. The Court Simply does not Consider Religion when
Deciding a Case
One might finally argue that the Court does not imply a religion
is false when it denies a Free Exercise claim because the Court simply
does not make decisions on the basis of religion at all. Because of Jef152
ferson’s famous “wall of separation,” it could be argued, the sacred
148

England, for example, swung between official Catholicism under Mary I and
official Protestantism under Elizabeth I, with both queens punishing dissidents with
death. JOHN GUY, TUDOR ENGLAND 226–308 (1988).
149
For instance, under the reign of Mary I, Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury and author of the Book of Common Prayer, recanted the heresy of which he
had been convicted when threatened with being burned at the stake. DIARMAID
MACCULLOCH, THOMAS CRANMER: A LIFE 555–605 (1996).
150
However, Cranmer took back his recantation and was sentenced to death. Id.
at 603–05. At the stake, he was asked again to recant to save his life, but instead he
thrust into the fire the hand that had signed the first recantation. Id.
151
This well-known legend, though it is apocryphal, illustrates the inability of the
state (or there, the church) to coerce belief. See A. Rupert Hall, Galileo nel XVIII secolo, 71 RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA 83, 375–78 (1979).
152
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Jefferson’s language regarding the “wall of separation” between church and state, and suggesting
that this principle inheres in the First Amendment). For an argument supporting a
strict application of Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” see Richard Rorty, Religion As
Conversation-Stopper, in RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168–74 (1999).
Rorty contends that religious views ought to be barred from civil discourse as premises for establishing law, for that enterprise ought to be guided by purely secular considerations. Id. at 169, 173. Rorty graciously applies this standard to his own atheism, allowing that under his model, neither he nor the religious devotee would be
permitted to contend for the philosophical premises supporting their political conclusions on any ground “save the assent we hope they will gain from our audience.”
Id. at 173. While this pragmatic approach may sometimes produce political consensus, it has no tendency to produce truth or good, because, as David Luban has noted,
the goodness of all pragmatic aims depends upon the correctness of the premises
supporting them. See David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, 18
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and the secular are kept apart such that the purely secular political
decisions of the Court do not impinge upon the religious convictions
of the individual. The Court knows no dogma—it believes no relig153
ion; it disbelieves no religion.
However, an appeal to the separation of church and state here
assumes that because the two concepts can be kept separate theoretically, they can be separated in practice. How do we determine the
province of the state and the province of religion? What makes
something a religious issue? But for cases such as Smith, most of us
would have assumed that the degree to which a government chooses
to restrict drug use is a secular matter. However, because Smith and
Black asserted that their use of peyote was a religious practice, what
had first seemed to be exclusively secular became a disputed religious
154
The same could be said of Lyng, for if anything seems comissue.
pletely secular, it is the building of roads. Yet because Native Americans asserted that the proposed site for the road was essential to their
religious practice, the construction of a highway became a religious
155
issue. The Court has spoken of the “purely secular considerations”
156
of a restrictive law in analyzing a Free Exercise claim, but how can
something about which a claimant has ultimate religious views be
called “purely secular?” Does the Court then define what is secular
157
and what is sacred? That, of all things, would hardly be neutral.
It might be argued then that the Court simply does not care
whether a religion is true when it decides a case. This is probably
correct, because the Court goes out of its way not to consider the
158
truth of a religion when adjudicating a Free Exercise case, but that
does nothing to obviate the implicit statement resulting from the
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 51 (1996); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS
FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 44 (2003) (criticizing Rorty and arguing that the
problem is not that fundamental premises are discussed in public debate, but the
manner in which these premises, sacred or secular, are introduced).
153
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872)).
154
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); supra Part IV.C.
155
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); supra
Part IV.C.
156
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). “A way of life, however virtuous
and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations . . . .” Id.
157
The Court does, at least, define what religion is for some statutory purposes.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining the “religious training
and belief” exemption in the Universal Military Training and Service Act as “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption . . . .”).
158
See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.
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Court’s judgment and decree. A man may say he does not care
whether Islam is true, but we can tell he does not think the religion is
true if he does not pray five times daily toward Mecca. The principle
goes the same for the Court; indeed, it may not remotely care
whether any of the religious doctrines that appear before it are true,
but its apathy can communicate just as much as its concern.
159
There is an inherent overlap of church and state; it is the overlap of reality. Religions have stated authoritative positions on almost
160
every aspect of our lives, and the government regulates almost every
161
area of our lives. Religions make commands of all mankind on the
basis of purported divine authority, and the government makes laws
that apply to all citizens on the basis of its capability of enforcement.
Because of the concurrent jurisdiction of the sacred and the secu162
lar, there will always be an abundance of conflict between church
and state. Such conflict, as when the government prohibits polygamy
163
and Mormonism promotes it, must be resolved. A fundamental
contradiction between the commands of the state and the commands
of religion may be resolved either by the government altering its laws

159

Consider the Court’s words in Lynch v. Donnelly: “In every Establishment Clause
case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing
unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible.” 465
U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (emphasis added) (holding that display of a crèche during the
holiday season did not violate the Establishment Clause because in context it was not
an endorsement of religion).
160
Such as tithes, the afterlife, and gay marriage.
161
Such as income tax, estate tax, and marriage licenses.
162
Consider these remarks of Rousseau:
While things were in this situation, Jesus came to establish a spiritual
kingdom on earth, which, by separating the theological from the political system, made the State no longer one, and caused those intestine
dissensions which have never ceased to agitate the Christian peoples.
This novel idea of a kingdom of the other world could never have entered the heads of pagans, and they always considered the Christians as
really rebels, who, with a hypocritical air of entire submission, were
only seeking the opportunity of rendering themselves independent and
masters by artfully usurping the authority which in their weakness they
pretended to respect. This was the cause of the Christians being persecuted. . . . However, as there had always been a prince and civil laws,
the consequence resulting from this double power has been a perpetual conflict for jurisdiction which has made any system of good polity
impossible in Christian States; and men could never certainly inform
themselves whether it was the master or the priest they were bound to
obey.
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 117 (Charles Frankel ed. & trans.,
Hafner Publishing 1957) (1762).
163
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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to grant permission (where the government admits it was wrong), or
by the continued restriction of a religious practice, in which case the
government says that the religion is wrong. Thus, pointing to the
church and state distinction cannot answer the question. Should the
principles of logic be suspended by this “wall of separation?”
Moreover, because church and state strive to control the same
facets and arenas of life, government can hardly be neutral toward religion. When a court adjudicates a Free Exercise case, it is issuing a
decision concerning the extent of the authority of another claimed
sovereign, namely, the individual’s religion. Where two sovereigns
claim rights to the same territory, we would not trust the tribunal of
one sovereign to be a neutral arbiter of the dispute; it is for this reason that the Constitution commits disputes between states to the
164
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—a superior sovereign.
Similarly, because the State seeks to govern much of the same territory as Religion, it cannot pretend to be neutral when adjudicating a
conflict between a religious adherent and the government, since it
165
has a vested interest in the matter (and unfortunately, there is no
superior sovereign to whom this dispute may be taken). This is not to
suggest that the government should recuse itself from deciding such
issues, for if the courts would not adjudicate any matters that presented religious questions, the courts could not adjudicate much of
anything. A less-than-impartial decision may be better than no decision at all. But if the courts must adjudicate, they ought to do so
166
without pretending to such a “lofty neutrality.”
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
The implicit judgment of individual religious beliefs described
167
here is essentially inevitable.
The only way to avoid this judgment
164
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999)
(adjudicating the question of whether certain portions of Ellis Island belonged to
New York or to New Jersey, and finding for New Jersey).
165
One might ask how this situation is any different than an everyday criminal
trial, where the government is both a party (the prosecution) and at the same time
an adjudicator (the judge), yet is expected to be neutral. The matters addressed
here are distinct because the very heart of the issue being addressed in a religion
case is the state’s sovereignty—not necessarily whether the state has the actual power
to do as it wishes, but whether, as the religious adherent claims, there exists a higher
Sovereign to which the state must answer. In a criminal prosecution, this fundamental philosophical conflict is not implicated; it is merely a question of the relationship
of the accused to the laws above him.
166
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
167
This phenomenon is probably not unique to the United States government,
but may be inherent in any non-theocracy, that is, in any state where the gods and
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would be to grant every Free Exercise claim, since no truth implica168
tions result from permitting the religious practice to continue.
However, the Court cannot decide every conflict in favor of religion—if it did, the results would be anarchically disastrous. Consider
the Court’s words in Reynolds: “Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously
contended that the civil government under which he lived could not
169
The Court must decide certain
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”
cases in favor of government restriction, relying on governmental policy against the specific religious practice. As we have seen, it has decided against polygamy, against racial discrimination, in favor of
roads, and against the use of controlled substances. But when the
Court decides these cases, it cannot do so and pretend that it has implied nothing about the truth of the religious belief. We are comfortable that the Court would deny a Free Exercise claim for the right
to human sacrifice, but our comfort cannot come without an understanding of the implicit judgment resulting from this denial. None of
this is to suggest that the Court should not apply the principles of the
Constitution in the face of a contrary religious belief, or that the
principles of the Constitution are unwise in such circumstances—
nevertheless, the Constitution is not without its consequences, and
those consequences should be acknowledged.
Because the Court makes these implicit assertions, it cannot be
said to be neutral toward religion. The Court’s stated policy of not
judging the truth of religions is bound up in the principle of neutral170
Government can hardly be said to act neutrally between itself
ity.
and a religion, or between religions generally, when it has implicitly
judged some of them false.
“Judgmental neutrality” is an accurate, if unfortunately ironic,
way of describing the policy the Court practices now. The Court
should therefore modify, clarify, or abandon the neutrality principle.
Such action is imperative in light of the fact that the Court has declared that neutrality is a controlling principle in Religion Clause

the government have concurrent jurisdiction. See supra note 162. Where the laws of
the church and the laws of the state conflict, one or the other must bend. If it is the
church that bends, then the state, by asserting its own sovereignty, has denied the
authority of the church. Since one of the church’s fundamental claims is its authority (that God, however defined, is the omnipotent Creator), the state has denied the
truth of the religion along with its authority.
168
See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
169
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
170
See supra Part II.
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171

cases, and given the Court’s declarations of how strict and serious is
172
the principle of neutrality. It does not make sense that an unworkable, even nonsensical principle should govern such important matters.
Because the Court frequently decides close cases by turning to
173
the neutrality principle, much is at stake on the idea of neutrality.
But if the principle is not workable, and if judgments against religion
must inevitably be made, the Court should not retain the illusion that
neutrality can guide the resolution of important cases. Perhaps what
is called the principle of neutrality can be clarified, such that the
Court will express what it is actually doing when it decides a Free Exercise case, rather than what it would like to think it is doing. If not
clarified, the neutrality principle should be abandoned and replaced
with a standard more meaningful and workable.
Further, because the Court implicitly judges some beliefs false,
174
The Court bethere must be that which the Court thinks is true.
lieves something; it believes in the validity of governmental policy—
175
perhaps this is its Established religion?
For instance, when the
171
See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’r of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (noting
the policy of neutrality); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (stating that
government must be neutral in the face of religious differences); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952) (holding that government must be denominationally
neutral).
172
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court held that “‘[t]he
government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages
none.’” 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). The Court further held that “[i]n the relationship
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”
Id. at 226. The Court has also held that “[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a
significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.” Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
173
See supra Part II.
174
The nature of government belief, including its epistemology, faith claims, and
the extent to which a government agency reflects or creates government belief,
would be an interesting topic for another paper.
175
There is evidence of this even in one of the earliest state-court Free Exercise
cases, where a Jewish man was required to testify on the Sabbath. Philips v. Gratz, 2
Pen. & W. 412, 416 (Pa. 1831). The court stated that “[r]ightly considered, there are
no duties half so sacred as those which the citizen owes to the laws.” Id. On a related
note, Michael J. Perry persuasively argues that for governmental policy to be based
on religious beliefs is neither a violation of the Establishment Clause, nor is it illegitimate in a liberal democracy. PERRY, supra note 152, at 20–52.
[I]n a liberal democracy, it is altogether fitting—it is altogether “liberal”—for religious believers to make political choices, including coercive choices—choices to ban or require conduct—on the ground of
what is, for them, a religious claim: that each and every person is sacred, that all persons are subjects of justice.
Id. at 51.
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Court implicitly asserted in Bob Jones University v. United States that
Almighty God did not command discriminatory practices, it was because the university’s practices contradicted federal law and the policy on which that law stood. Thus the Court knew that governmental
policy against discrimination was the truth upon which it made its decisions, and the Court was therefore forced to restrict the religious
practice that contradicted this truth. The Court did not merely restrict the practice; it implicitly declared that the practice was not divine.
For the most part, we do not know what the Court affirmatively
177
believes, because it rarely offers direct statements of its beliefs.
However, we can at least identify several specific doctrines that the
Court does not believe. The Court does not believe that God com178
179
mands polygamy, that God commands racial discrimination, that
180
Native American worship is necessary for the salvation of mankind,
nor, in dicta, does the Court believe that any worthy god commands
181
human sacrifice. In fact, that the Court does maintain these beliefs
is one of the reasons it cannot be said to be neutral. While it may not
hold a specific opinion on the Noble Eightfold Path or the doctrine
of transubstantiation, it does believe in some fundamental truth—
however amorphous that greatest-common-denominator truth may
182
be —that ultimately supports governmental policy.
176

461 U.S. 574 (1983).
For a rare exception to this generality, see the words of Justice Douglas in
Zorach v. Clauson: “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” 343 U.S. at 313. Justice Douglas has inferred the governmental belief
in a Deity from the nature of governmental policy. See id.
178
See generally Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
179
See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
180
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
181
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (noting that it would not be seriously contended
that the state was powerless to intervene if a religion commanded human sacrifice).
But see Genesis 22:2 (“[God] said, ‘Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love,
and go to the land of Mori’ah, and offer him there as a burnt offering upon one of
the mountains of which I shall tell you.’”). Perhaps if the Judeo-Christian God commanded human sacrifice in the present (even if He were to intervene at the last instant and stop the act), the Court would have a greater problem with this particular
Deity than it has expressed to date.
182
While legal pragmatism—a results-oriented, anti-formalist legal philosophy—
has been advocated by such jurists as Richard Posner as a means of reaching societally amenable legal results without standing on any particular philosophical assumption, see Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5, 10 (1996),
David Luban wisely observes that none of these results are meaningful, or in any
sense correct, absent knowledge that the philosophical assumptions undergirding
them are true:
[I]n principle philosophical questions have right and wrong answers,
177
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Above all, this Comment does not suggest that the implicit
judgments of the Court are inherently good or inherently bad. The
only normative claim made here is that the Court should be consistent. If these implicit judgments are inevitable in our legal system,
then we should not consider the fact of judgment to be what is good
or bad, but rather the result of the judgment. We may ask whether
the case was rightly decided on the law, and whether the decision was
supported by sound policy, but we should not praise or condemn a
case merely because it happened to judge another belief system false.
As with many matters, this comes down to a deep question of policy,
grounded in our fundamental moral and social values. What do we
as a society think of polygamy? What do we think of racial discrimination? What do we think of sacrificing our roads to preserve Native
American religion? None of these are posed as rhetorical questions—each requires an answer founded on some kind of substantive
belief in value, and none can be answered by appealing to neutrality.
Perhaps many readers are disturbed by the idea of the Supreme
Court judging religions false. In our age of tolerance and acceptance, where we fear the perceived ills of all religious fundamentalism, we are not fond of our government making absolute pronouncements, even under its breath, about any religious belief. This
is the sort of thing that starts wars, we think, and it just does not seem
very nice. However, this Comment submits that each of us is far more
comfortable with the idea of a court judging beliefs than we would
readily either expect or admit. Consider, in the context of criminal
183
This defense is used when a defenlaw, the deific decree defense.
dant does something horrifically atrocious, such as bludgeoning his
wife and son, shooting a police officer, or repeatedly stabbing his
184
stepmother, and then says that God commanded the action.
and legal decisions that presuppose philosophical positions can be
criticized for getting them wrong. On this line of thinking, we find a
straightforward and relatively uncontroversial way in which legal pragmatism cannot be freestanding. Legal decisions will turn on right answers to philosophical questions in the same way that they turn on right
answers to factual questions. And a judge who tries to “do” law while
ignoring the relevant questions of first philosophy can be accused of
intellectual and professional irresponsibility.
Luban, supra note 152, at 51. For objections to Luban’s argument, see Richard
Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response to David Luban, in RORTY, supra note 152, at
104.
183
For a brief synopsis of the deific decree defense, see People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d
128, 129–30 (Colo. 1992).
184
For cases where the deific decree defense was presented, see Serravo, 823 P.2d
at 130–31 (defendant not guilty by reason of insanity for stabbing his wife “to sever
the marriage bond” according to God’s command); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242
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Where the belief is sincerely held, it may operate as a valid defense to
185
the crime. But we do not call it the Free Exercise defense—we call
186
Essentially, the defendant’s religious belief
it the insanity defense.
is so grossly divergent from the society’s morals that it is entitled to
no respect. At best it entitles its holder to medical or psychological
treatment rather than normal incarceration. Thank God we are willing so to judge.

(Miss. 1986) (defendant shot police officers because God commanded the act); State
v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999) (husband bludgeoned his wife and son with a
hammer after God revealed he would be cast into the lake of fire if he refused to do
so); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 351–53 (Utah 2001) (Mormon fundamentalist killed
his sister-in-law and her infant child pursuant to divine revelation); State v. Cameron,
674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (defendant stabbed his stepmother repeatedly
upon God’s command to stop the “evil spirit” within her).
185
See Serravo, 823 P.2d at 129–30.
186
Id.

